The recent meeting between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Myanmar’s military chief, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, held on May 9, 2025, in Moscow, marks a pivotal moment in the geopolitical landscape of Southeast Asia. Occurring during a military parade commemorating the Soviet Union’s victory in World War II, the encounter was more than ceremonial. It symbolized China’s reaffirmed endorsement of the Myanmar junta, which seized power in a 2021 coup and has since been internationally condemned for ongoing human rights abuses and war crimes.
This meeting, Xi’s first with Min Aung Hlaing since the coup symbolised the deepening Beijing-Moscow coordination on Myanmar. It also revealed China’s strategic calculus which incorporates stabilizing its borders, securing economic interests, and maintaining influence in a region where Western engagement has waned. The absence of any criticism of the junta’s actions reinforced Myanmar’s military perception of impunity, while simultaneously challenging the international community’s ability to pressure the regime on human rights grounds.
One particular concern to Bangladesh is how these evolving dynamics affect the already fragile prospects for Rohingya repatriation. With over one million Rohingya refugees residing in camps in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh has long relied on Chinese diplomatic assurances to mediate repatriation efforts. Yet, Xi’s strategic support for the junta raises doubts about China’s commitment to those pledges. As geopolitical interests begin to overshadow humanitarian imperatives, the humanitarian and diplomatic burden on Bangladesh deepens, risking prolonged displacement and increasing regional instability.
Strategic Implications for Beijing- Naypyidaw Ties
China’s renewed public embrace of the Myanmar military underscores a clear strategic agenda. Myanmar remains crucial to Beijing’s regional ambitions due to its geographic proximity, its role in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and its access to the Bay of Bengal. The China–Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC)—linking the Rakhine State port of Kyaukphyu to China’s Yunnan Province offers Beijing a vital alternative trade route that bypasses the Malacca Strait, reducing China’s vulnerability to maritime chokepoints.
Since the coup, China has cautiously managed its relationship with Myanmar’s military government, balancing its formal recognition of state sovereignty with informal ties to ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) along its border. However, the Moscow meeting signals a shift toward a more assertive and overt backing of the junta. This is evident in several recent developments: Myanmar’s enactment of the Public Security Services Law allowing Chinese security forces to operate inside the country to protect Chinese investments, the junta’s recognition of Chinese New Year as an official holiday, and the continued prioritization of BRI projects despite widespread conflict.
These moves serve China’s dual objective: securing strategic investments and ensuring cross-border stability. Beijing is especially wary of disruption in key trade and transit zones. The recent regime recapture of Lashio in northern Shan State, reportedly achieved without resistance due to Chinese diplomatic pressure on the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), illustrates Beijing’s ability to shape outcomes on the ground. Furthermore, China’s pressure on the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) to cede key towns such as Kyaukme, Hsipaw, and Nawnghkio to junta forces underscores its strategic intent to stabilize the CMEC corridor.
Russia’s role as host also cannot be overlooked. Moscow’s willingness to convene and accommodate this meeting reflects growing strategic alignment with Beijing in the Indo-Pacific, especially in countering Western influence and sanctions. For the Myanmar junta, this support is a geopolitical lifeline. Shunned by Western democracies, it has found in China and Russia not only military and economic backing but also a level of diplomatic legitimacy that bolsters its internal and external standing. Yet, even with this support, the junta’s control over Myanmar is far from consolidated. Ethnic armed groups such as the Arakan Army (AA) continue to seize territory, particularly in Rakhine State, raising further questions about the feasibility of large-scale infrastructure projects like CMEC. Nevertheless, China appears determined to navigate these risks, often acting as an informal mediator while prioritizing its strategic interests over normative concerns about governance or human rights.
Repercussions for Rohingya Repatriation
Bangladesh’s longstanding efforts to facilitate the safe, voluntary, and dignified repatriation of Rohingya refugees now face additional obstacles in light of China’s enhanced support for Myanmar’s military. The immediate aftermath of the Xi–Min meeting has already cast doubt on China’s earlier commitments. In March 2025, the Chief Advisor of Bangladesh had travelled to Beijing, where President Xi offered assurances that China would support the creation of favourable conditions for repatriation. This included promises of financial aid and potential cooperation with the Myanmar military and the Arakan Army to stabilize Rakhine State.
However, these diplomatic gains have been undercut by Xi’s recent meeting with Min Aung Hlaing. In reaffirming China’s partnership with the junta without mention of the Rohingya issue or any human rights concerns, Beijing has effectively deprioritized repatriation in its foreign policy agenda. China’s focus now clearly lies in protecting strategic investments and ensuring a pliable regime in Naypyidaw that can cooperate on infrastructure and security matters.
The consequences for Bangladesh are immediate and severe. The humanitarian conditions in Rohingya refugee camps are deteriorating, characterized by food shortages, rising insecurity, and growing discontent. The UN Secretary-General’s recent visit and renewed international attention have brought some momentum to the issue, but these efforts risk being drowned out by geopolitical shifts. As China leverages its influence to promote the CMEC and strengthen its role as a regional power broker, the repatriation agenda risks being sidelined unless it aligns with China’s strategic calculations.
The complexity of the situation on the ground in Rakhine further complicates these challenges. The Arakan Army, now in control of much of the region, is not a recognized party in official diplomatic frameworks, making negotiations difficult. Furthermore, there are growing indications that Myanmar is strategically repositioning itself within a broader bloc of states aligned with Beijing and Moscow. This includes members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and key BRICS nations, which may now intensify engagement with the junta under the guise of economic diplomacy and South–South cooperation. Such normalization risks further isolating Bangladesh’s efforts and reducing international pressure on Myanmar to act on the repatriation front.
Ultimately, the Xi–Min meeting signifies a critical moment for the region. As China doubles down on strategic engagement with Myanmar’s military, humanitarian concerns including the urgent need for Rohingya repatriation are being pushed further down the agenda. Bangladesh now faces the dual burden of managing a protracted humanitarian crisis while navigating a shifting geopolitical terrain where its leverage is coming under challenge.
– Saume Saptaparna Nath is a Research Associate at the KRF Center for Bangladesh and Global Affairs (CBGA). She is on Study Leave for Pursuing Her Higher Studies in Japan.