As 2025 has approached, it increasingly looks like Myanmar’s military junta is on the verge of dramatic collapse, the culmination of one of Asia’s longest-running civil conflicts yet. Once the force that held sway over Myanmar’s political landscape since 1962, the once mighty Tatmadaw now controls just 20 percent of the country’s towns and townships, while it is bracing for the worst territorial losses and internal schisms it has ever seen. That aura of invincibility shattered as a result of the fall of a number of regional military command centers, including the Northeast Regional Command center in Lashio and the headquarters of the Western Command in Rakhine State. As a result of ‘Operation 1027’ starting in October, this accelerated junta control breakdown, as the deterioration of junta control even longer, strongly suggests that Myanmar is coming to a tipping point where the political landscape of the country will significantly transform.
Recent developments paint a picture of a weakening junta grip. The Arakan Army has seized 14 of 17 townships, including the strategic border town of Maungdaw, working to control all of Myanmar’s 270-kilometer border with Bangladesh. After a bloody siege, the military’s last stand at BGP5 barracks drove a knife into Brigadier-General Thurein Tun’s back resulting in more than 450 military fatalities. At the same time, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army captured Laukkai in January and Lashio in August, marking the first time in over five decades that one of the military’s regional commands has fallen to resistance forces.
The Accelerating Territorial Collapse to the Hands of Resistance Groups
The most dramatic developments have been in Rakhine State with the Arakan Army systematically dislodging junta control and taking over 14 of 17 townships. A crucial turning point was the fall of Maungdaw after an intense siege of the BGP5 barracks. The battle’s ferocity was evident in the AA’s description of their advance: Deep spike-filled ditches were covered with more than a thousand landmines, complex fortifications and reinforced bunkers were in place, and defenders had their hands full.
Further momentum was secured by the seizure of Gwa, a township in Rakhine state that is just 250 kilometers from Yangon. The strategic victory has brought resistance forces closer to Myanmar’s commercial capital than before and they could seem to pose a threat to one of the junta’s last strongholds. Now, they cling to just three coastal townships in Rakhine State: Sittwe, Kyaukphyu, and Munaung, desperately bolstering these positions as their last stands in the region. The situation has been equally dire in the north for the junta. In August 2024, the MNDAA overran the history-defining Lashio, the first of the military’s 14 regional commands to fall to resistance forces in over 50 years. Lashio is on the key highway between Mandalay and China’s Yunnan Province, ripping one of the junta’s most important supply lines in a particularly significant loss.
Border regions, however, have not been the only areas to see territorial collapse. Resistance forces have made deep inroads into Sagaing Region and Mandalay Region, in central Myanmar. The Three Brotherhood Alliance and People’s Defence Forces (PDFs) have launched successful attacks on the outskirts of Mandalay, Myanmar’s second-largest commercial city. The capture of Pinlebu by the KIA and PDFs showed the resistance’s ability and capacity to coordinate very complex operations across regions and armed groups.
In the pattern of these territorial losses, we can trace a systematic weakness in the junta’s military strategy. Though it has kept air dominance and access to lots of firepower, including fighter jets and helicopter gunships, the military has had little luck in stopping determined resistance forces from gaining the upper hand. In the first two years after the coup, the junta funneled over $1 billion in weapons purchases, the UN Special Rapporteur documented, mainly from Russia, China, and Singapore. Nevertheless, this formidable arsenal has failed to check the losses of land control to very determined adroitly feminine opponents using sophisticated guerrilla techniques.
During the civil war, however, unlike ever before, thousands of soldiers defected from their posts. This trend ramped up in the first quarter of 2024, as nearly 2,500 junta troops surrendered in Laukkai alone. According to an Al-Jazeera report, Naung Yoe said that by December 2023, around 10,000 police officers and 3,900 military personnel had defected or surrendered after the coup which number might be more by December 2024 and early January 2025. And while these defections have not just junked the military’s fighting capacity, they have given resistance forces valuable intelligence and expertise.
Three Brotherhood Alliance: The Game-Changing Coalition
The most formidable military coalition challenging the junta’s control is the three-brotherhood alliance comprising the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), and Arakan Army (AA). In October 2023, ‘Operation 1027’ represented a turning point in Myanmar’s civil war, involving unprecedented synchronization and military capabilities among resistance groups.
Its success comes from the Alliance’s mass of experienced fighters, its control of territory, and its strategic coordination. Each member brings distinct strengths: it was able to draw on the MNDAA’s understanding of the Chinese border region as well as the TNLA’s expertise in guerrilla warfare and the AA’s more sophisticated military capabilities built in the five years since its 2009 formation. While relatively young by other ethnic armed groups, it has been impressively effective in the military realm. More importantly, its capture of 14 Rakhine State townships shows it has the sophisticated tactical abilities to engage in siege warfare at BGP5, all the way to coordinated urban operations in Rakhine State. However, there have been internal tensions for the Alliance. The MNDAA’s reversal of its military cooperation with the National Unity Government (NUG) in Shan State is a sign of fissures in the entire resistance coalition.
Military’s Internal Fractures: Signs of Systemic Collapse
The capture of Brigadier General Kyaw Kyaw Than in Rakhine State has given what would perhaps be a unique glimpse of the military’s increasingly torn internal condition. In a remarkable video released by the Arakan Army, the general urged his fellow officers to surrender, saying at the time of the final assault on their position they were desperately short of food, ammunition, medical supplies and even drinking water.
It shows several critical weaknesses in the structure of the military. First, the breakdown in the chain of command and logistics systems that have traditionally been the strength of the military is severe. This is the general’s testimony of delayed reinforcements and supply shortages, showing that the military’s traditional advantages in organization and resources decay very quickly. There’s also further growing evidence of dissent among the old guard over Min Aung Hlaing’s leadership. In three years, the junta leader has reshuffled his cabinet four times, including key posts in defense and home affairs, an erratic pattern that highlights deep trust defects and instability right at the top of military leadership levels.
The crisis in conscription has grossly weakened military effectiveness. The junta has taken to forcibly conscripting civilians, including young men ‘snatched from their beds’ or ‘taken off the streets’ to bolster its war effort, reports say. As a desperate measure, this has severely reduced a lot of the fighting capability, as these conscripts have had neither training nor motivation. A second sign of internal collapse is a wave of surrenders and defections across many fronts. Almost 2,500 junta soldiers surrendered in January 2024 in Laukkai alone to the Three Brotherhood Alliance, which is one of the largest mass surrenders from the war to date.
China, India and Other’s Pivotal Role: Between Stability and Change
In particular, China has become a major player whose position has shifted dramatically in concert with the weakening of the junta, after the junta lost control of critical border areas, trade routes and border countries.
China’s primary concerns appear to be threefold: It needs to protect its substantial investment in Myanmar, maintain border stability, and stall the growth of a pro-Western government. Beijing has increasingly intervened in the conflict because of the loss of border gates and the mushrooming of cyber-scam centers preying on Chinese citizens. Myanmar has accepted a massive aid package from China–more than $1 billion–that hinges on the junta moving toward elections in 2025, but analysts argue, it would be nothing but a ‘sham election’. The Chinese government has also become more willing to talk with ethnic armed groups, including those in the Three Brotherhood Alliance. It is also a substantial break with China’s tradition of only supporting the central government. Although short-lived, the Haigeng Agreement that was brokered by the Chinese in January 2024 highlights Beijing’s growing ability to both influence the junta and the resistance forces.
India’s position has changed, too. Historically, India has given arms and aid to the junta, though recent reports say the country is reaching out to the opposition forces. However, Russia’s role as a major arms supplier to the junta has been important—but it is waning gradually. The UN Special Rapporteur noted more than $1 billion in weapons and military gear purchases by the junta in the first two years after the coup, mostly from Russia, China, and Singapore. Thailand’s position is particularly tricky, as it straddles a large and shared border with Myanmar, and has extensive economic interests there. However, the recent success of resistance forces across the Thai border, such as the Karen National Liberation Army’s seizure of key hills overlooking the town of Myawaddy could induce Bangkok to rethink this approach. Moreover, Bangladesh is facing a very deep dilemma as its border with Myanmar is in jeopardy, while it also does have room for discussions with the armed groups to repatriate the Rohingya people to Rakhine.
Possible Post-Junta Challenges: Unity vs. Fragmentation
The first concern encompasses the engagements of several ethnic regional armed organizations with the National Unity Government (NUG). Although there was a united front against the junta, their future vision did not seem to be uniform for all. This discontentment was the reason behind the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army’s declaration not to work with the NUG in public in September 2024. Some of these ethnic armies are more concerned with achieving autonomy in their regions than with establishing democracy in the country.
One major complex is the question of federal democracy. There has also been slowness by some resistance movements to accept the framework introduced by the National Unity Consultative Council through the Federal Democratic Charter that outlines how governance should look in Myanmar post-junta. Further, the question of Rohingya also constitutes a new dimension. The level of autonomy that the Arakan Army can enforce in the Rakhine State raises issues about the new status of the nearly 600000 remaining Rohingya people there. Although the AA has stated that its future plans would incorporate all communities, the events of the past few months, including drone raids that resulted in the death of Rohingya civilians, have raised questions about their dedication to ensuring the protection of the rights of minorities.
Reconstruction of the economy is going to be a daunting task. As the famine threat projection for a few countries, mainly Rakhine State, has been issued by the United Nations, it depicts a larger scenario. The question of how to accomplish security sector reform, particularly with respect to the thousands of armed actors on different sides, will be essential. Countries recovering from civil wars have disarmed, demobilized, and reintegrated for many being somewhat successful, and it will be too in Myanmar but complicated to execute.
To summarize, mounting evidence points out that the Myanmar military junta is going through the toughest times since coming to power which is late 2021. This triad of loss of territorial integrity, loss of internal cohesion, and loss of external support can render the regime to a dead end. But what is clear, is that while the regime may collapse, the consequences and the means to such a collapse are easy to see.
– Kawsar Uddin Mahmud is a Research Intern at the KRF Center for Bangladesh and Global Affairs (CBGA).