For many decades, the South China Sea (SCS) has been a center of geopolitical rivalry among the great powers—the United States, China, Japan—and other coastal countries, with competing claims of territory and strategic interests giving rise to notable conflicts. In recent months, the rapport between China and the Philippines has been predominantly stressed, marked by progressively belligerent encounters in disputed waters. However, on July 2, 2024, representatives from both countries met in Manila for the 9th meeting of their Bilateral Consultation Mechanism on the SCS with a view to easing tensions and finding common ground for peace mechanisms through dialogues. The meeting was held after a series of hostilities, most notably the June 17 incident near Second Thomas Shoal in which a Philippine Navy supply ship hit a Chinese vessel. This escalation happened just days after China announced new maritime patrol regulations, known as China Coast Guard Order #3 (CCG Regulation), giving authority to its coast guard to impede foreign ships for up to 60 days if suspected of unlawfully entering what China considers its territorial waters.
In the meantime, the bilateral dialogue exhibits a substantial step towards de-escalation. The Department of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines noted that while “substantial progress” was brought forth on improving the situation at sea, “significant differences remain.” This optimism echoes the dynamics of the negotiations and the long path ahead in resolving the deep-rooted disputes between the two countries. However, while diving deep into the complex realities of this issue, we cannot but consider diverse factors that influence the sustainability of this de-escalation approach. From domestic politics to the influence of external powers, every single aspect related to this geopolitical development holds a significant depth in determining the future of China-Philippines relations and the wider stability of the SCS region.
The Status of Diplomatic Gestures
The July deal between China and the Philippines to de-escalate tensions in the SCS is a welcome development, but fragility regarding long-standing territorial disputes and strategic interests cannot be overstated. On July 2, 2024, the meeting between Philippine Foreign Affairs Undersecretary Ma. Theresa Lazaro and Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Chen Xiaodong caused both countries to acknowledge “that there is a need to restore trust, rebuild confidence, and create conditions conducive to productive dialogue and interaction.” This is undoubtedly a positive step yet with diverse challenges. In this respect, a notable challenge to sustaining this de-escalation is the disagreement over territorial claims. China continuously asserts its “indisputable sovereignty” over vast areas of the SCS, including the Philippines’ EEZ. This approach unswervingly gainsays the 2016 ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, which favoured Manila’s territorial claims. Over the years, China’s rejection of this verdict and incessant assertion of the “nine-dash line” as its maritime border gave rise to a major hurdle to a permanent resolution in this regard.
On June 15, 2024, the commencement of CCG Regulation #3 further brings about some complexities to the existing tension. Through this regulation, China holds the power to thwart foreign vessels or persons suspected of violating Chinese law in waters of ‘Chinese jurisdiction’ for up to 60 days without trial. This vagueness in the wording of the regulation, especially about what constitutes “Chinese jurisdiction,” raises questions about possible misunderstandings and conflicts. Dr. Chen Xiangmiao earlier noted that “Since last year, maritime tensions…., have escalated between China and the Philippines. This escalation has had repercussions on both sides’ coast guard communication mechanisms, including those related to Ren’ai Jiao.” This failure in diplomatic communication channels incited the risk of unexpected miscalculations and escalations. This insubstantiality of diplomatic channels has also been spurred by the provocative remarks from officials in both countries. For instance, Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro’s claim that a Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson disrespected President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. during a news conference, labelling it as ‘low and gutter-level talk,’ exhibits the gradual erosion of diplomatic efforts by provocative rhetoric.
The Role of Domestic Politics
The dynamics of domestic politics had influenced the foreign policy decisions of both China and the Philippines, particularly about their territorial disputes in the SCS. Talking about the Philippines, unlike his predecessor, Rodrigo Duterte, the administration of President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. took a different approach to China. While Duterte maintained closer rapport with Beijing and restrained territorial disputes, Marcos has adopted a more assertive position in defending Philippine sovereignty in the West Philippine Sea. Also, the Filipinos are progressively aware of China’s actions in the disputed waters and they deem it as Beijing’s expansionist policy which is a threat to the national sovereignty and economic welfare of the Philippines. According to the survey conducted by Social Weather Stations in November 2018, it was found that 84% of Filipinos believed the government needed to assert its rights in the West Philippine Sea as postulated in the 2016 arbitral ruling.
However, President Marcos Jr.’s confrontational policy towards China has garnered support from various sectors of Philippine society. For instance, Speaker of the House of Representatives Martin Romualdez defined the “unilateral actions” of China as a “blatant escalation of tensions,” marking the robust sentiment among Philippine lawmakers. In the same way, General Romero Branwner Jr. of the Armed Forces of the Philippines directed Filipino fishers to continue their activities in the West Philippine Sea, saying that “it is ours.”
From the Chinese perspective, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has long capitalized on nationalism and territorial integrity as key pillars of its legitimacy of territorial expansion. Considering it as an integral part of China’s “core interests”, the CCP has long been very stalwart about SCS. Furthermore, President Xi Jinping has garnered wide support by asserting political capital on China’s maritime claims. In this respect, the notions of the “Chinese Dream” and the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” central to Xi’s political ideology, include the strategy of reinstating China’s historical maritime rights. While it serves the strategic purposes of Xi’s government, it also caters to domestic expectations of a strong stance on territorial issues.
The Influence of External Powers: A Subtle Balancing Act?
The influence of external powers, especially the U.S., Japan, and other regional players, inevitably impacts the trajectory of China-Philippines relations and the prospects for sustained de-escalation. The United States, as a long-standing ally of the Philippines, strives to pursue a delicate balancing act. The backbone of the security relationship between the U.S. and the Philippines is built up by the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty. In recent years, this relationship has been reinvigorated, partly in response to China’s growing assertiveness in the SCS. Following the June 17, 2024 confrontation near Second Thomas Shoal, the U.S. reiterates Washington’s commitment to defend the Philippines under the ‘mutual defense treaty.’ Moreover, the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) signed in 2014 has further reinforced U.S.-Philippine military relations. This agreement consents to the rotational presence of U.S. troops in the Philippines and is considered a counterbalance to China’s growing military capabilities in the region. In 2023, both countries came forward with four new EDCA sites, bringing the total to nine, drawing criticism from China. However, while many in the Philippines deem U.S. cooperation as a deterrent against Chinese assertiveness, others worry about being entangled in the crossfire of great power competition. The U.S. has always been vocal against China’s assertive presence in the South China Sea. Commemorating the anniversary of the 2016 arbitral ruling, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken expressed that Washington is still “deeply concerned” about China’s claims “over vast areas that are clearly within the maritime jurisdiction of Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei.”
In this complex equation, Japan is also another important external player. On July 8, 2024, Japan and the Philippines held their second “2+2” Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting. This meeting, coming shortly after the China-Philippines bilateral talks, sheds light on the Philippines’ strategy of varying its security partnerships. The involvement of Japan is also driven by its own disquiets about China’s maritime aggressiveness, not only in the South China Sea but also in the East China Sea where Japan and China face their own territorial disputes over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Japan was “closely monitoring events” in both seas, and its Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed concerns about the “problematic provisions” in China’s 2021 Coast Guard Law. By the way, the Philippines-Japan Reciprocal Access Agreement, signed earlier in 2024, gives room for the deployment of troops on each other’s territory. This agreement, analogous to the ones Japan has with the UK and Australia, denotes a substantial expansion of Japan’s security role in the region, providing the Philippines with another likely counterweight to China.
Economic Interdependence Vis-à-vis Territorial Ambitions
According to the Philippine Statistics Authority, as of April 2024, Being the largest supplier of imported goods and a major export destination, China is one of the largest trading partners and an unavoidable source of investment for the Philippines. In this respect, denoting the vitality of the economic bond, the president of the Federation of Filipino Chinese Chambers of Commerce and Industry Inc (FFCCCII), Cecilio K Pedro stated that “China, being our largest trade partner for centuries and our traditional ally…., plays a critical role in our economic life.” However, this current has faced setbacks due to the territorial disputes in the SCS and the escalating tensions have created a milieu of ambiguity that holds “adversely affected, not only the investment and expansion plans of us Filipino entrepreneurs and companies, but also those of foreign investors and tourists,” according to Pedro.
Also, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) which offers notable infrastructure investment opportunities for the Philippines, makes the rapport more multifaceted as well. Under President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., the Philippines expressed a willingness to balance economic cooperation with the defence of its territorial claims, evident by the recent bilateral meeting in which both countries conversed their respective positions on Ayungin Shoal (Second Thomas Shoal) while also upholding their commitment to de-escalate tensions. Along with the development, the meeting also resulted in the signing of an ‘Arrangement on Improving Philippines-China Maritime Communication Mechanisms,’ providing room for mutual understanding to manage disputes while not giving up economic ties. Nevertheless, the sustainability of this balancing act is not beyond question. The frequent incidents of Chinese nuisance of Philippine vessels, including the June 17 collision near Second Thomas Shoal, show the flimsiness of diplomatic agreements in the face of on-the-ground realities. In addition, the economic implications of China’s new Coast Guard Order #3, are also considerable in this regard, which regulation might deter international shipping and exploration activities in the region, possibly impacting the Philippine economy and regional trade movements.
However, given the complex realities of historical grievances, strategic interests, economic considerations, and geopolitical dynamics, the prospects for sustained de-escalation are still vague, although the bilateral meeting held in Manila brought forth the need to ‘restore trust’ and ‘rebuild confidence’ for the betterment of the bilateral rapport. Despite ‘substantial progress’ on taking steps to manage tensions, ‘significant differences remain,’ denotes the challenges ahead. Whatever the rhetoric and realities are, this bilateral relationship with mutual recognition of the risks related to continued escalation, invokes strong diplomatic engagement and a robust willingness to explore peaceful resolutions.
– Kawsar Uddin Mahmud is a Research Intern at the KRF Center for Bangladesh and Global Affairs (CBGA).